You are not logged in.

Firm compliance with social insurance obligations where there is a weak surveillance and enforcement mechanism: empirical evidence from Shanghai

Maitra, Pushkar, Smyth, Russell, Nielsen, Ingrid, Nyland, Chris and Zhu, Cherrie 2007, Firm compliance with social insurance obligations where there is a weak surveillance and enforcement mechanism: empirical evidence from Shanghai, Pacific economic review, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 577-596, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2007.00373.x.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Firm compliance with social insurance obligations where there is a weak surveillance and enforcement mechanism: empirical evidence from Shanghai
Author(s) Maitra, Pushkar
Smyth, Russell
Nielsen, IngridORCID iD for Nielsen, Ingrid orcid.org/0000-0002-9065-9778
Nyland, Chris
Zhu, Cherrie
Journal name Pacific economic review
Volume number 12
Issue number 5
Start page 577
End page 596
Total pages 20
Publisher Wiley
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2007-12
ISSN 1361-374X
1468-0106
Keyword(s) Social Sciences
Economics
Business & Economics
VOLUNTARY OVERCOMPLIANCE
MODEL
Summary This article examines why firms in Shanghai comply or over-comply with social insurance obligations in a regulatory environment where the expected punishment for non-compliance is low. Our first finding is that firms found to be in non-compliance in the first audit in 2001 were moved into a separate violation category and the probability of being reaudited in 2002 was significantly higher if the firm was in that category. Our second main result is that, across the board, firms which were reaudited continued to underpay in 2002 but the extent of underpayment was significantly reduced. © 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Language eng
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2007.00373.x
Field of Research 150311 Organisational Behaviour
Socio Economic Objective 910402 Management
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2007, Wiley
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30076708

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Management
Connect to link resolver
 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 9 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 9 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 121 Abstract Views, 1 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Tue, 25 Aug 2015, 15:08:18 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.