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Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution

Anbarci,N and III,JHB 2008, Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution, Publisher,.

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Title Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Author(s) Anbarci,NORCID iD for Anbarci,N orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086
III,JHB
Publication date 2008
Total pages 1
Publisher Publisher
Summary We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the Kalai- Smorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.
Field of Research 0 Not Applicable
Socio Economic Objective 0 Not Applicable
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30077886

Document type: Book
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
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