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Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Anbarci, Nejat and Boyd III, John H. 2008, Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Geelong, Vic..

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Title Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Author(s) Anbarci, NejatORCID iD for Anbarci, Nejat orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086
Boyd III, John H.
Publication date 2008-10-21
Series School Working Paper - Economics Series ; SWP 2008/11
Total pages 16
Publisher Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
Place of publication Geelong, Vic.
Keyword(s) RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2008_11
Summary We introduce two new variations on the Nash demand game. One, like all known Nash-like demand games so far, has the Nash solution outcome as its equilibrium outcome. In the other, the range of solutions depends on an exogenous breakdown probability; surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome proves to be the most robust equilibrium outcome. While the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution always finishes on top, there is no possible general ranking among the remaining solution concepts considered; in fact, the rest of the solution concepts take their turns at the bottom at various bargaining problems, depending on the specifics of the bargaining setup.
Language eng
HERDC Research category CN.1 Other journal article
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30077886

Document type: Report
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
RePEc Working Papers
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