You are not logged in.

Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China’s listed firms

Hu, Fang, Pan, Xiaofei and Tian, Gary 2013, Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China’s listed firms, Pacific basin finance journal, vol. 24, pp. 235-255, doi: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.07.003.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China’s listed firms
Author(s) Hu, Fang
Pan, Xiaofei
Tian, Gary
Journal name Pacific basin finance journal
Volume number 24
Start page 235
End page 255
Total pages 21
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2013-09
ISSN 0927-538X
Keyword(s) CEO pay dispersion
Tournament incentive
Political connections
Split-share structure reform
Summary This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.07.003
Field of Research 150201 Finance
Socio Economic Objective 900101 Finance Services
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2013, Elsevier
Persistent URL

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Finance
Connect to link resolver
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 31 Abstract Views, 1 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Wed, 09 Sep 2015, 15:23:01 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact