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Committees with leaks

Ghosh, Saptarshi P. and Roy, Jaideep 2015, Committees with leaks, Games and economic behavior, vol. 90, pp. 207-214, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.012.

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Title Committees with leaks
Author(s) Ghosh, Saptarshi P.
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name Games and economic behavior
Volume number 90
Start page 207
End page 214
Total pages 8
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2015-03
ISSN 0899-8256
Keyword(s) Leakage
Career Concerns
Informative voting
Welfare
Summary We analyze the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are ‘leaked’ with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is achievable only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces random leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of committees with careerist experts.
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.012
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2015, Elsevier
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30078442

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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Created: Thu, 24 Sep 2015, 15:51:29 EST

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