The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting

Brusco, Sandro, Dziubiński, Marcin and Roy, Jaideep 2012, The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting, Games and economic behavior, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 447-469, doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004.

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Title The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting
Author(s) Brusco, Sandro
Dziubiński, Marcin
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name Games and economic behavior
Volume number 74
Issue number 2
Start page 447
End page 469
Total pages 23
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2012-03
ISSN 0899-8256
Keyword(s) downs
free entry
runoff system
Summary We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾3n⩾3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize.
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2011, Elsevier
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
2018 ERA Submission
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