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The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform

Nwokora, Zim 2014, The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform, Party politics, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 918-929, doi: 10.1177/1354068812462922.

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Title The distinctive politics of campaign finance reform
Author(s) Nwokora, ZimORCID iD for Nwokora, Zim orcid.org/0000-0002-2171-9319
Journal name Party politics
Volume number 20
Issue number 6
Start page 918
End page 929
Total pages 12
Publisher Sage
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2014-11
ISSN 1354-0688
1460-3683
Keyword(s) Campaign and finance law
causal model
office goals
policy goals
political parties
Summary This article presents a unified theory explaining several conflicting empirical observations in the politics of campaign finance. It identifies those circumstances that foster or frustrate the enactment of financing laws that increase the competitiveness of elections. I argue that the competitiveness of financing laws is a result of three strong incentives when they operate in differently structured party systems. First, lawmakers have an incentive to make laws to protect their incumbency from competitors. This incentive generally overwhelms the (weaker) incentive to enact popular, competition-enhancing reforms. Secondly, lawmakers, when they act through political parties, have an incentive to cooperate with rivals to reduce the costs of political defeats. Thirdly, lawmakers seek to enact reforms that are consistent with their normative goals. These incentives combine with several party system variables to determine when campaign finance reform is likely to occur and how it will impact on the competitiveness of elections.
Language eng
DOI 10.1177/1354068812462922
Field of Research 160699 Political Science not elsewhere classified
1606 Political Science
Socio Economic Objective 970116 Expanding Knowledge through Studies of Human Society
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2012, The Author/s
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30081081

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
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