The distinctive common good

Duke, George 2016, The distinctive common good, Review of Politics, vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 227-250, doi: 10.1017/S0034670516000036.

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Title The distinctive common good
Author(s) Duke, GeorgeORCID iD for Duke, George
Journal name Review of Politics
Volume number 78
Issue number 2
Start page 227
End page 250
Total pages 24
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Place of publication Cambridge, Eng.
Publication date 2016
ISSN 1748-6858
Summary This paper defends the traditional distinctive notion of the common good against the claim that it is normatively redundant on the aggregative conception. The first two sections of the paper outline the different candidate conceptions of the common good and the normative role of the common good within natural law theories. The paper then considers some difficulties faced by the instrumental and aggregative conceptions, before developing an Aristotelian account of the distinctive conception of the common good and demonstrating its normative significance for a natural law account of political and legal authority.
Language eng
DOI 10.1017/S0034670516000036
Field of Research 220305 Ethical Theory
160609 Political Theory and Political Philosophy
180122 Legal Theory, Jurisprudence and Legal Interpretation
1606 Political Science
Socio Economic Objective 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2016, University of Notre Dame
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