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Hotelling-downs competition with free entry when voters have an option to contest

Dziubiński, Marcin and Roy, Jaideep 2013, Hotelling-downs competition with free entry when voters have an option to contest, Journal of public economic theory, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 620-653, doi: 10.1111/jpet.12034.

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Title Hotelling-downs competition with free entry when voters have an option to contest
Author(s) Dziubiński, Marcin
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name Journal of public economic theory
Volume number 15
Issue number 4
Start page 620
End page 653
Total pages 34
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
Place of publication Chichester, Eng.
Publication date 2013
ISSN 1097-3923
1467-9779
Summary Osborne shows that for almost all distributions of voters' preferences, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in the classical Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with free entry. We show that equilibrium is generically possible if in addition one allows voters an option to announce their candidacy to compete side-by-side with office-seeking players. The model studied in this paper renders Osborne and the celebrated citizen-candidate model à la Osborne and Slivinski as two extreme cases. We characterize the equilibrium set with two central questions: (i) can there be equilibria where only voters contest? and (ii) are equilibria with contesting office-seeking players possible? We also show that in our general setting, extremists are typically voter-candidates so that in every two-party contest, office-seeking politicians stay out of competition.
Language eng
DOI 10.1111/jpet.12034
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
1401 Economic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2013, Wiley Periodicals
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30083535

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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