Ill-defined versus precise pre-play communication in the traveler's dilemma

Chakravarty, Sujoy, Dechenaux, Emmanuel and Roy, Jaideep 2010, Ill-defined versus precise pre-play communication in the traveler's dilemma, Southern economic journal, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 351-368, doi: 10.4284/sej.2010.77.2.351.

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Title Ill-defined versus precise pre-play communication in the traveler's dilemma
Author(s) Chakravarty, Sujoy
Dechenaux, Emmanuel
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name Southern economic journal
Volume number 77
Issue number 2
Start page 351
End page 368
Total pages 18
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
Place of publication Chichester, Eng.
Publication date 2010-10
ISSN 0038-4038
Summary This article reports results from an experiment comparing the effects of vague versus precise pre-play communication in a highly competitive two-player game with conflicting interests. In the classic Traveler's Dilemma, non-binding precise messages about intent of play are pure cheap talk. We conjecture that a form of imprecise pre-play communication whereby subjects can submit ill-defined messages may help foster cooperation because of their vagueness. Comparing behavior both across modes of communication and to a baseline case without communication, we find that cooperation is highest when players can communicate using precise numerical messages. When communication with ill-defined messages is allowed, then conditional on receiving a message, subjects act more cooperatively than when no message is received. However, overall, the ability to exchange ill-defined messages does not substantially improve cooperation.
Language eng
DOI 10.4284/sej.2010.77.2.351
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2010, Wiley-Blackwell
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
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