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A location game on disjoint circles

Dziubiński, Marcin, Datta, Debabrata and Roy, Jaideep 2009, A location game on disjoint circles, International game theory review, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 391-406, doi: 10.1142/S021919890900239X.

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Title A location game on disjoint circles
Author(s) Dziubiński, Marcin
Datta, Debabrata
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name International game theory review
Volume number 11
Issue number 4
Start page 391
End page 406
Total pages 17
Publisher World Scientific Publishing
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2009-12
ISSN 0219-1989
Keyword(s) competitive locations
disjoint spaces
winning/tying strategies
equilibrium configurations
Summary Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N > K < 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face a resource mobility constraint such that not all N locations can be placed in the first round. The player with the highest secured area wins the game and otherwise the game ends in a tie. Earlier research has shown that for K = 1, the second mover always has a winning strategy in this game. In this paper we show that with K > 1, the second mover advantage disappears as in this case both players have a tying strategy. We also study a natural variant of this game where the resource mobility constraint is more stringent so that in each round each player chooses a single location where we show that the second mover advantage re-appears. We suggest some Nash equilibrium configurations of locations in both versions of the game.
Language eng
DOI 10.1142/S021919890900239X
Field of Research 140104 Microeconomic Theory
1401 Economic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2009, World Scientific Publishing Company
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Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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