Phenomenology and naturalism: a hybrid and heretical proposal

Reynolds, Jack 2016, Phenomenology and naturalism: a hybrid and heretical proposal, International journal of philosophical studies, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 393-412, doi: 10.1080/09672559.2016.1175106.

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Title Phenomenology and naturalism: a hybrid and heretical proposal
Author(s) Reynolds, JackORCID iD for Reynolds, Jack
Journal name International journal of philosophical studies
Volume number 24
Issue number 3
Start page 393
End page 412
Total pages 20
Publisher Taylor & Francis
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2016-05
ISSN 0967-2559
Keyword(s) phenomenology
Arts & Humanities
Summary In this paper I aim to develop a largely non-empirical case for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. To do so, I will criticise what I take to be the standard construal of the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and naturalism, and defend a ‘minimal’ version of phenomenology that is compatible with liberal naturalism in the ontological register (but incompatible with scientific naturalism) and with weak forms of methodological naturalism, the latter of which is understood as advocating ‘results continuity’, over the long haul, with the relevant empirical sciences. Far from such a trajectory amounting to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul, I contend that insofar as phenomenologists care about reigning in the excesses of reductive versions of naturalism, the only viable way for this to be done is via the impure and hybrid account of phenomenology I outline here.
Language eng
DOI 10.1080/09672559.2016.1175106
Field of Research 220310 Phenomenology
220309 Metaphysics
2203 Philosophy
Socio Economic Objective 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2016, Informa UK Limited
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