Corruption via media capture : the effect of competition

Vaidya, Samarth and Gupta, Rupayan 2016, Corruption via media capture : the effect of competition, Southern economic journal, vol. 82, no. 4, pp. 1327-1348, doi: 10.1002/soej.12105.

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Title Corruption via media capture : the effect of competition
Author(s) Vaidya, SamarthORCID iD for Vaidya, Samarth
Gupta, Rupayan
Journal name Southern economic journal
Volume number 82
Issue number 4
Start page 1327
End page 1348
Total pages 22
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
Place of publication Hoboken, N.J.
Publication date 2016-04
ISSN 0038-4038
Summary In this article, we compare a government's optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures: monopoly versus duopoly. While there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly, it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co-opts with the government. We find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former, media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption.
Language eng
DOI 10.1002/soej.12105
Field of Research 140213 Public Economics- Public Choice
Socio Economic Objective 910299 Microeconomics not elsewhere classified
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2015, Southern Economic Association
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Deakin Business School
Department of Economics
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