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A truthful double auction for device-to-device communications in cellular networks

Li, Peng, Guo, Song and Stojmenovic, Ivan 2016, A truthful double auction for device-to-device communications in cellular networks, IEEE journal on selected areas in communications, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 71-81, doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2452587.

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Title A truthful double auction for device-to-device communications in cellular networks
Author(s) Li, Peng
Guo, Song
Stojmenovic, Ivan
Journal name IEEE journal on selected areas in communications
Volume number 34
Issue number 1
Start page 71
End page 81
Total pages 11
Publisher IEEE
Place of publication Piscataway, N.J.
Publication date 2016-01
ISSN 0733-8716
Keyword(s) Device-to-device
double auction
multi-cell
truthfulness
Science & Technology
Technology
Engineering, Electrical & Electronic
Telecommunications
Engineering
WIRELESS
UNDERLAY
Summary Data traffic in cellular networks has dramatically increased in recent years as the emergence of various new wireless applications, which imposes an immediate requirement for large network capacity. Although many efforts have been made to enhance wireless channel capacity, they are far from solving the network capacity enhancement problem. Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is recently proposed as a promising technique to increase network capacity. However, most existing work on D2D communications focuses on optimizing throughput or energy efficiency, without considering economic issues. In this paper, we propose a truthful double auction for D2D communications (TAD) in multi-cell cellular networks for trading resources in frequencytime domain, where cellular users with D2D communication capability act as sellers, and other users waiting to access the network act as buyers. Both intra-cell and inter-cell D2D sellers are accommodated in TAD while the competitive space in each cell is extensively exploited to achieve a high auction efficiency. With a sophisticated seller-buyer matching, winner determination and pricing, TAD guarantees individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. Furthermore, we extend our TAD design to handle a more general case that each seller and buyer ask/bid multiple resource units. Extensive simulation results show that TAD can achieve truthfulness as well as high performance in terms of seller/buyer sanctification ratio, auctioneer profit and network throughput.
Language eng
DOI 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2452587
Field of Research 080599 Distributed Computing not elsewhere classified
Socio Economic Objective 970108 Expanding Knowledge in the Information and Computing Sciences
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2016, IEEE
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30085094

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Information Technology
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