Valuing talent: do CEOs' ability and discretion unambiguously increase firm performance

Cheung, Kwok Tong Samuel, Naidu, Dharmendra, Navissi, Farshid and Ranjeeni, Kumari 2017, Valuing talent: do CEOs' ability and discretion unambiguously increase firm performance, Journal of corporate finance, vol. 42, pp. 15-35, doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.11.006.

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Title Valuing talent: do CEOs' ability and discretion unambiguously increase firm performance
Author(s) Cheung, Kwok Tong SamuelORCID iD for Cheung, Kwok Tong Samuel orcid.org/0000-0001-9413-8374
Naidu, Dharmendra
Navissi, Farshid
Ranjeeni, Kumari
Journal name Journal of corporate finance
Volume number 42
Start page 15
End page 35
Total pages 21
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2017-02
ISSN 0929-1199
1872-6313
Keyword(s) firm performance
CEO ability
discretion
business strategy
monitoring
Summary This study investigates how the association between more able managers and firm performance, documented in prior research, is affected by the joint effect of managerial discretion and monitoring quality. We find that higher levels of managerial discretion afford more able managers to further improve firm outcomes only when such discretion is monitored closely to curb more able managers' rent seeking incentives. Our results are robust to a battery of additional and sensitivity analyses that we perform.
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.11.006
Field of Research 150303 Corporate Governance and Stakeholder Engagement
150310 Organisation and Management Theory
150201 Finance
1502 Banking, Finance And Investment
Socio Economic Objective 970115 Expanding Knowledge in Commerce
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2016, Elsevier
Free to Read? No
Free to Read Start Date 2019-03-01
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30088797

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Accounting
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