Openly accessible

Optimal vigilance level and hiring illegal immigrants

Nabin, Munirul and Sgro, Pasquale 2017, Optimal vigilance level and hiring illegal immigrants, Theoretical economics letters, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1-12, doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.71001.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads
nadin-optimalvigilence-2017.pdf Published version application/pdf 678.32KB 39

Title Optimal vigilance level and hiring illegal immigrants
Author(s) Nabin, MunirulORCID iD for Nabin, Munirul orcid.org/0000-0003-1680-0582
Sgro, PasqualeORCID iD for Sgro, Pasquale orcid.org/0000-0002-1450-730X
Journal name Theoretical economics letters
Volume number 7
Issue number 1
Start page 1
End page 12
Total pages 12
Publisher Scientific Research Publishing
Place of publication Irvine, Calif.
Publication date 2017
ISSN 2162-2078
2162-2086
Keyword(s) Illegal Immigrants
Vigilance
Cournot Competition
Welfare
Summary This paper assumes a Ricardian Economy and analyzes migration of illegal unskilled workers in a model of Cournot Duopoly where firms are producing homogenous and non-traded goods, and hiring illegal immigrants. The focus is on the behaviours of firms and the implications for the output, prices and employment of domestic workers in that industry. A two-stage simultaneous move game is set up: In Stage 1, for a given technology and vigilance level, each individual firm will decide whether to hire illegal immigrants. In Stage 2, each firm will choose the Cournot output level. Using this structure, we provide additional insights as to why firms hire illegal workers and what motivates these firms in their hiring practices. Furthermore the presence of illegal immigrants may create more employment for domestic workers and a social planner can be strategic in choosing optimal level of vigilance as we have shown that multiple solutions for optimal vigilance are possible and also Pareto ranked.
Language eng
DOI 10.4236/tel.2017.71001
Field of Research 140211 Labour Economics
Socio Economic Objective 910208 Micro Labour Market Issues
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2017, The Authors & Scientific Research Publishing
Free to Read? Yes
Use Rights Creative Commons Attribution licence
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30090491

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Open Access Collection
Department of Economics
Connect to link resolver
 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.

Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 307 Abstract Views, 40 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Wed, 11 Jan 2017, 08:54:38 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.