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Strategic dissent in the Hotelling-Downs model with sequential entry and private information

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha, Bhalla, Manaswini, Chatterjee, Kalyan and Roy, Jaideep 2016, Strategic dissent in the Hotelling-Downs model with sequential entry and private information, Research in economics, pp. 1-30, doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2016.11.002.

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Title Strategic dissent in the Hotelling-Downs model with sequential entry and private information
Author(s) Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha
Bhalla, Manaswini
Chatterjee, Kalyan
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name Research in economics
Start page 1
End page 30
Total pages 30
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2016-11
ISSN 1090-9443
Keyword(s) sequential entry
unobserved quality
strategic dissent
Summary We analyze the Hotelling-Downs model of winner-take-all elections with sequential entry where n≥2 'office-seeking' candidates with privately known qualities choose entry decisions and commit to policy platforms on entering. Voters receive informative public signals about the quality of each contestant once all platforms are announced. We characterize two-party equilibria when the order of entry is exogenously given. In these equilibria, entry can occur in any 'round' with positive probability: high-quality candidates signal their type through showing ideological dissent with the voters while low-quality ones randomize between (mis)-signaling quality through dissent and staying out. Interestingly, while informative public signals can keep low-quality candidates out of competition up to a certain degree, electoral competition improves the voter's information about candidate types beyond what the signals can reveal. However this endogenous mechanism of strategic information transmission leads to political polarization.
Notes In Press
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.rie.2016.11.002
Field of Research 1401 Economic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 970114 Expanding Knowledge in Economics
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2016, University of Venice
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Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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