Motivated to acquire? The impact of CEO regulatory focus on firm acquisitions

Gamache, Daniel L., McNamara, Gerry, Mannor, Michael J. and Johnson, Russell E. 2015, Motivated to acquire? The impact of CEO regulatory focus on firm acquisitions, Academy of management journal, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 1261-1282, doi: 10.5465/amj.2013.0377.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Motivated to acquire? The impact of CEO regulatory focus on firm acquisitions
Author(s) Gamache, Daniel L.
McNamara, Gerry
Mannor, Michael J.
Johnson, Russell E.
Journal name Academy of management journal
Volume number 58
Issue number 4
Start page 1261
End page 1282
Total pages 23
Publisher Academy of Management
Place of publication Briarcliff Manor, N.Y.
Publication date 2015-08-01
ISSN 0001-4273
Keyword(s) acquisitions
CEO compensation
regulatory fit
regulatory focus theory
strategic leadership
upper echelons theory
Summary Regulatory focus theory proposes that decision making and goal pursuit occur via either a promotion focus (a sensitivity to gains and a desire for advancement and growth) or a prevention focus (a sensitivity to losses and a desire for stability and security). Recent theorizing in strategic management research suggests that there may be important firm-level outcomes influenced by the regulatory focus of top executives. We expand research on regulatory focus theory by testing whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) regulatory focus impacts the proclivity of firms to undertake acquisitions. Furthermore, regulatory focus theory suggests that the effects of people’s promotion and prevention foci are magnified when their regulatory focus is congruent with salient situational characteristics, a phenomenon known as regulatory fit. As a test of this idea, we demonstrate how the effects of CEO promotion and prevention foci are differentially impacted by one such characteristic, namely incentive compensation. Our findings indicate that CEO regulatory focus impacts both the quantity and scale of acquisitions undertaken by a firm. We also find some support for our arguments that these relationships are moderated by stock option pay.
Language eng
DOI 10.5465/amj.2013.0377
Field of Research 150310 Organisation and Management Theory
1503 Business And Management
1505 Marketing
Socio Economic Objective 910402 Management
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2015, Academy of Management
Persistent URL

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Management
2018 ERA Submission
Connect to link resolver
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 74 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 380 Abstract Views, 15 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Wed, 25 Jan 2017, 12:20:17 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact