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A financial transactions tax: inefficient or needed systemic reform?

North, Gillian and Buckley, Ross 2012, A financial transactions tax: inefficient or needed systemic reform?, Georgetown journal of international law, vol. 43, pp. 745-762.

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Title A financial transactions tax: inefficient or needed systemic reform?
Author(s) North, Gillian
Buckley, Ross
Journal name Georgetown journal of international law
Volume number 43
Start page 745
End page 762
Total pages 18
Publisher Georgetown University Law Center
Place of publication Washington, D.C.
Publication date 2012
ISSN 1550-5200
Summary The European Commission has included a Eurozone financial transaction tax in its longterm budget, as a first step towards a global tax. This move was taken despite negative European Commission and International Monetary Fund staff reports, which concluded that a tax would reduce the efficiency of capital markets, and raise the cost of capital. The efficiency frameworks used in the staff reviews were unduly narrow. Markets work best when there are strong links between market trading and real economic activity. Of late, these links have become increasingly tenuous and latent market and financial system risks are mounting. Carefully calibrated legal and tax responses are required to change market behaviour. Such a tax as part of an integrated policy framework would reduce short-term momentum trading and promote longer-term investment that would better reflect underlying economic fundamentals. So we argue the European Commission is correct in proposing to adopt such a tax.
Language eng
Field of Research 180199 Law not elsewhere classified
1801 Law
Socio Economic Objective 949999 Law
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2012, Georgetown University Law Center
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30091044

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Law
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