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Vickrey vs. eBay: why second-price sealed-bid auctions lead to more realistic price-demand functions

Barrot, Christian, Albers, Sönke, Skiera, Bernd and Schäfers, Björn 2010, Vickrey vs. eBay: why second-price sealed-bid auctions lead to more realistic price-demand functions, International journal of electronic commerce, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 7-38, doi: 10.2753/JEC1086-4415140401.

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Title Vickrey vs. eBay: why second-price sealed-bid auctions lead to more realistic price-demand functions
Author(s) Barrot, Christian
Albers, Sönke
Skiera, Bernd
Schäfers, Björn
Journal name International journal of electronic commerce
Volume number 14
Issue number 4
Start page 7
End page 38
Total pages 32
Publisher Taylor & Francis
Place of publication New York, N.Y.
Publication date 2010
ISSN 1086-4415
1557-9301
Keyword(s) market research
on-line auctions
pricing
Vickrey auctions
willingness-to-pay
Language eng
DOI 10.2753/JEC1086-4415140401
Field of Research 0806 Information Systems
1503 Business And Management
1505 Marketing
Socio Economic Objective 970115 Expanding Knowledge in Commerce
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2010, M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30091186

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Management
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Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 10 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 13 times in Scopus
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