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The trillion dollar question: can a central bank bail out a central counterparty clearing house which is "Too Big To Fail"?

Chamorro-Courtland, Christian 2012, The trillion dollar question: can a central bank bail out a central counterparty clearing house which is "Too Big To Fail"?, Brooklyn journal of corporate, financial and commercial law, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 433-485.

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Title The trillion dollar question: can a central bank bail out a central counterparty clearing house which is "Too Big To Fail"?
Author(s) Chamorro-Courtland, Christian
Journal name Brooklyn journal of corporate, financial and commercial law
Volume number 6
Issue number 2
Start page 433
End page 485
Total pages 53
Publisher Brooklyn Law School
Place of publication Brooklyn, N.Y.
Publication date 2012
ISSN 1934-2497
Summary I have previously argued in my Article, Central Counterparties and theNew Transnational Lex Mercatoria,' that the new transnational lexmercatoria is the main source of law governing the operations of centralcounterparties (CCPs or singularly CCP). It is a legal framework whichrecognizes that the customs, practices, and usages of CCPs are a legallybinding source of law.That is to say, CCPs have operated as self-regulatory organizations(SROs) and have developed their own operations for risk management anddefault procedures by altering and adapting their customs and practices overthe past several decades. Adhering to this framework, courts in variouscommon law jurisdictions have enforced these customs and practices aslegally binding between participants of the clearing system.
Language eng
Field of Research 1801 Law
Socio Economic Objective 970118 Expanding Knowledge in Law and Legal Studies
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2012, Brooklyn Law School
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30091490

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Law
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