You are not logged in.

Institutional monitoring, political connections and audit fees: evidence from Malaysian firms

Tee, CM, Gul, Ferdinand, Foo, YB and Teh, CG 2017, Institutional monitoring, political connections and audit fees: evidence from Malaysian firms, International journal of auditing, pp. 1-13, doi: 10.1111/ijau.12086.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Institutional monitoring, political connections and audit fees: evidence from Malaysian firms
Author(s) Tee, CM
Gul, Ferdinand
Foo, YB
Teh, CG
Journal name International journal of auditing
Start page 1
End page 13
Total pages 13
Publisher Wiley
Place of publication Chichester, Eng.
Publication date 2017-01-22
ISSN 1090-6738
1099-1123
Keyword(s) Institutional ownership
institutional domiciles
political connections
audit fees
Summary This study employs data on Malaysian firms from 2003 to 2011 to show that ownership by institutional investors is positively associated with audit fees, and this positive association is stronger for firms that are politically connected to the Malaysian government. The results of this study are aligned with the theories that institutional investors can play an effective monitoring role by demanding higher audit quality, particularly if their investee firms are politically connected. Additional tests reveal that the main results are largely driven by foreign institutional investors, while it is insignificant for local institutional investors. Therefore, our evidence suggests that institutional investors, particularly foreign institutions, demand increased audit effort (proxied by audit fees) as a method to monitor politically connected firms.
Language eng
DOI 10.1111/ijau.12086
Field of Research 1501 Accounting, Auditing And Accountability
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2017, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30091648

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Accounting
Connect to link resolver
 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 28 Abstract Views, 1 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Fri, 03 Mar 2017, 10:51:55 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.