You are not logged in.

The public enforcement of directors' duties: a normative inquiry

Keay, Andrew 2014, The public enforcement of directors' duties: a normative inquiry, Common law world review, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 89-119, doi: 10.1350/clwr.2014.43.2.0267.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title The public enforcement of directors' duties: a normative inquiry
Author(s) Keay, Andrew
Journal name Common law world review
Volume number 43
Issue number 2
Start page 89
End page 119
Total pages 31
Publisher Sage Publications
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2014-06
ISSN 1473-7795
1740-5556
Keyword(s) directors
enforcement
duties
shareholders
public interest
Summary The general duties owed by directors to their companies area critical element of company law overall, and corporate governance inparticular. If these duties are breached, the board, acting on behalf ofthe company, is empowered to decide whether to take action againstthe miscreant directors. If no action is taken then shareholders arepermitted to initiate private derivative actions against the directorson behalf of the company. This might be seen as the primary privateenforcement mechanism used in the UK when directors commitbreaches. But there have been relatively few actions commenced byshareholders, probably because of the many disincentives that existfor them. Given this state of affairs, this paper examines whetherthere is a need for the public enforcement of duties by some authorityso that there is an enhancement of corporate governance in the UK.
Language eng
DOI 10.1350/clwr.2014.43.2.0267
Field of Research 1801 Law
Socio Economic Objective 0 Not Applicable
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2014, Sage Publications
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30091949

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Law
Connect to link resolver
 
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Versions
Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 0 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 25 Abstract Views, 1 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Mon, 13 Mar 2017, 15:08:39 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.