"Things unreasonably compulsory": A peircean challenge to a humean theory of perception, particularly with respect to perceiving necessary truths

Legg, Catherine 2014, "Things unreasonably compulsory": A peircean challenge to a humean theory of perception, particularly with respect to perceiving necessary truths, Cognitio: Journal of Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 89-112.

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Title "Things unreasonably compulsory": A peircean challenge to a humean theory of perception, particularly with respect to perceiving necessary truths
Author(s) Legg, CatherineORCID iD for Legg, Catherine orcid.org/0000-0002-0231-5415
Journal name Cognitio: Journal of Philosophy
Volume number 15
Issue number 1
Start page 89
End page 112
Total pages 24
Publisher PhilPapers
Publication date 2014
ISSN 2316-5278
Keyword(s) Peirce
Hume
Necessity
Naturalism
Modal epistemology
Mathematical proof
Percept
Perceptual judgment
Percipuum
Language eng
Field of Research 220210 History of Philosophy
220304 Epistemology
Socio Economic Objective 970122 Expanding Knowledge in Philosophy and Religious Studies
HERDC Research category C2 Other contribution to refereed journal
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30093312

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
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