Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

Pycia, Marek and Unver, M Utku 2017, Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources, Theoretical Economics, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 287-329, doi: 10.3982/TE2201.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
Author(s) Pycia, Marek
Unver, M Utku
Journal name Theoretical Economics
Volume number 12
Issue number 1
Start page 287
End page 329
Total pages 43
Publisher Wiley
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2017-01-01
ISSN 1933-6837
Keyword(s) C78
Group strategy-proofness
Pareto efficiency
no-transfer allocation and exchange
single-unit demand
Individual strategy-proofness
Arrovian preference aggregation
Lorenz dominance
Language eng
DOI 10.3982/TE2201
Field of Research 1401 Economic Theory
Socio Economic Objective 0 Not Applicable
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2017, The Authors
Persistent URL

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
Connect to link resolver
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 6 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 7 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 28 Abstract Views, 0 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Mon, 10 Apr 2017, 15:35:26 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact