course bidding at business schools

Sönmez, Tayfun and Unver, M Utku 2010, course bidding at business schools, International Economic Review, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 99-123, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00572.x.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title course bidding at business schools
Author(s) Sönmez, Tayfun
Unver, M Utku
Journal name International Economic Review
Volume number 51
Issue number 1
Start page 99
End page 123
Total pages 25
Publisher Wiley
Place of publication London, Eng.
Publication date 2010-02
ISSN 0020-6598
Summary Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at business schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms: to infer student preferences and to determine who have bigger claims on course seats. We show that these two roles may easily conflict, and preferences induced from bids may significantly differ from the true preferences. Therefore, these mechanisms, which are promoted as market mechanisms, do not necessarily yield market outcomes. We introduce a Pareto-dominant market mechanism that can be implemented by asking students for their preferences in addition to their bids over courses. © (2010) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Language eng
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2009.00572.x
Field of Research 14 Economics
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2010, Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
Persistent URL

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
Connect to link resolver
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 47 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 53 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 159 Abstract Views, 0 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Tue, 11 Apr 2017, 16:08:53 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact