When vagueness induces indirect competition: strategic incompleteness of contracts

Roy, Jaideep and Serfes, Konstantinos 2002, When vagueness induces indirect competition: strategic incompleteness of contracts, Economic theory, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 603-621, doi: 10.1007/s00199-001-0234-y.

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Title When vagueness induces indirect competition: strategic incompleteness of contracts
Author(s) Roy, Jaideep
Serfes, Konstantinos
Journal name Economic theory
Volume number 20
Issue number 3
Start page 603
End page 621
Total pages 19
Publisher Springer Verlag
Place of publication Berlin, Germany
Publication date 2002-10
ISSN 0938-2259
1432-0479
Keyword(s) informed principal
strategic vagueness
information flow
incomplete contracts
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/s00199-001-0234-y
Field of Research 1401 Economic Theory
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2002, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30100561

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
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