Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders

Anbarci, Nejat and Roy, Jaideep 2018, Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders, Theory and decision, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 1-9, doi: 10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7.

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Title Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
Author(s) Anbarci, NejatORCID iD for Anbarci, Nejat
Roy, Jaideep
Journal name Theory and decision
Volume number 84
Issue number 1
Start page 1
End page 9
Total pages 9
Publisher Springer Science + Business Media
Place of publication New York, N.Y.
Publication date 2018-01-01
ISSN 0040-5833
Keyword(s) no-loss constraint (NLC)
double auctions (DA)
uniform price
balanced budget
Social Sciences
Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
Business & Economics
Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7
Field of Research 14 Economics
17 Psychology And Cognitive Sciences
22 Philosophy And Religious Studies
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2017, Springer Science + Business Media
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
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