Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities

Anbarci, Nejat, Gomis Porqueras, Pedro and Pivato, Marcus 2018, Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities, Journal of evolutionary economics, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 365-397, doi: 10.1007/s00191-017-0544-2.

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Title Evolutionary stability of bargaining and price posting: implications for formal and informal activities
Author(s) Anbarci, NejatORCID iD for Anbarci, Nejat orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086
Gomis Porqueras, Pedro
Pivato, Marcus
Journal name Journal of evolutionary economics
Volume number 28
Issue number 2
Start page 365
End page 397
Total pages 33
Publisher Springer Verlag
Place of publication Berlin, Germany
Publication date 2018-04-01
ISSN 0936-9937
1432-1386
Keyword(s) price posting
bargaining
formal and informal sectors
Social Sciences
Economics
Business & Economics
UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
DIRECTED SEARCH
POSTED PRICES
TAX CHANGES
AUCTIONS
SECTOR
MARKETS
MODEL
INFLATION
POLICY
Language eng
DOI 10.1007/s00191-017-0544-2
Field of Research 1401 Economic Theory
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30105508

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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