The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case

Silvers, Randy 2006, The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case, Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Geelong, Vic..

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Title The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case
Author(s) Silvers, Randy
Publication date 2006
Series School Working Paper - Economic Series ; SWP 2006/23
Total pages 27
Publisher Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance
Place of publication Geelong, Vic.
Keyword(s) D82
D86.
Moral Hazard
Ex Ante Contracting
Informed Principal
Technology
Value of Information
RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2006_23
Notes This working paper was later published in the journal 'Games and Economic Behavior' and is available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002
Language eng
HERDC Research category CN.1 Other journal article
Related work DU:30043097
Copyright notice ©2006, The Authors
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30105625

Document type: Report
Collection: RePEc Working Papers
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