The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case
Silvers, Randy 2006, The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case, Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Geelong, Vic..
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The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case
This working paper was later published in the journal 'Games and Economic Behavior' and is available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.002
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