The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case Silvers, Randy 2006, The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case, Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Geelong, Vic.. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case Author(s) Silvers, Randy Publication date 2006 Series School Working Paper - Economic Series ; SWP 2006/23 Total pages 27 Publisher Deakin University, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance Place of publication Geelong, Vic. Keyword(s) D82 D86. Moral Hazard Ex Ante Contracting Informed Principal Technology Value of Information RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2006_23 Language eng HERDC Research category CN.1 Other journal article Copyright notice ©2006, The Authors Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30105625 Document type: Report Collection: RePEc Working Papers Related Links Link Description Connect to Elements publication management system Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Wed, 20 Dec 2017, 14:43:52 EST Thu, 21 Dec 2017, 04:01:20 EST Thu, 21 Dec 2017, 05:05:23 EST Thu, 21 Dec 2017, 09:58:24 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science Cited 0 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 12 Abstract Views, 1 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Wed, 20 Dec 2017, 14:43:52 EST

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