How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm Anbarci, Nejat and Feltovich, Nick 2018, How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm, Journal of economic behavior and organization, vol. 145, pp. 320-334, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm Author(s) Anbarci, Nejat orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086 Feltovich, Nick Journal name Journal of economic behavior and organization Volume number 145 Start page 320 End page 334 Total pages 15 Publisher Elsevier Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands Publication date 2018-01 ISSN 0167-2681 Keyword(s) nash demand game unstructured bargaining real effort dominant bargaining power experiment Language eng DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020 Field of Research 1402 Applied Economics HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal ERA Research output type C Journal article Copyright notice ©2017, Elsevier B.V. Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30105838 Document type: Journal Article Collection: Department of Economics Related Links Link Description Connect to published version Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Mon, 15 Jan 2018, 14:01:14 EST Tue, 16 Jan 2018, 04:00:45 EST Tue, 16 Jan 2018, 05:03:53 EST Fri, 16 Feb 2018, 14:14:16 EST Fri, 16 Feb 2018, 14:15:57 EST Fri, 16 Feb 2018, 14:17:25 EST Sat, 24 Feb 2018, 01:32:11 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science Cited 0 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 74 Abstract Views, 5 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Mon, 15 Jan 2018, 14:01:14 EST

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