How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm

Anbarci, Nejat and Feltovich, Nick 2018, How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm, Journal of economic behavior and organization, vol. 145, pp. 320-334, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020.

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Title How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm
Author(s) Anbarci, NejatORCID iD for Anbarci, Nejat orcid.org/0000-0001-5952-8086
Feltovich, Nick
Journal name Journal of economic behavior and organization
Volume number 145
Start page 320
End page 334
Total pages 15
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2018-01
ISSN 0167-2681
Keyword(s) nash demand game
unstructured bargaining
real effort
dominant bargaining power
experiment
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.020
Field of Research 1402 Applied Economics
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2017, Elsevier B.V.
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30105838

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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