Independence + Accountability: Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank Waller, Christopher 2011, Independence + Accountability: Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS REVIEW, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 293-301, doi: 10.20955/r.93.293-302. Attached Files Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads Title Independence + Accountability: Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank Author(s) Waller, Christopher orcid.org/0000-0003-2406-9910 Journal name FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS REVIEW Volume number 93 Issue number 5 Start page 293 End page 301 Total pages 9 Publisher FEDERAL RESERVE BANK ST LOUIS Place of publication St. Louis, Mo. Publication date 2011-09 ISSN 0014-9187 Keyword(s) Social Sciences Business, Finance Economics Business & Economics Language eng DOI 10.20955/r.93.293-302 Field of Research 1502 Banking, Finance And Investment HERDC Research category CN.1 Other journal article Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30106083 Document type: Journal Article Collection: Department of Economics Related Links Link Description Connect to published version Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Tue, 30 Jan 2018, 09:52:08 EST Wed, 31 Jan 2018, 04:00:22 EST Thu, 01 Feb 2018, 06:46:44 EST Wed, 07 Feb 2018, 05:05:04 EST Wed, 23 May 2018, 16:03:48 EST Wed, 23 May 2018, 16:05:34 EST Wed, 23 May 2018, 16:06:46 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 3 times in TR Web of Science Cited 0 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 7 Abstract Views, 0 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Tue, 30 Jan 2018, 09:52:08 EST

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