Independence + Accountability: Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank

Waller, Christopher 2011, Independence + Accountability: Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS REVIEW, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 293-301, doi: 10.20955/r.93.293-302.

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Title Independence + Accountability: Why the Fed Is a Well-Designed Central Bank
Author(s) Waller, ChristopherORCID iD for Waller, Christopher orcid.org/0000-0003-2406-9910
Journal name FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS REVIEW
Volume number 93
Issue number 5
Start page 293
End page 301
Total pages 9
Publisher FEDERAL RESERVE BANK ST LOUIS
Place of publication St. Louis, Mo.
Publication date 2011-09
ISSN 0014-9187
Keyword(s) Social Sciences
Business, Finance
Economics
Business & Economics
Language eng
DOI 10.20955/r.93.293-302
Field of Research 1502 Banking, Finance And Investment
HERDC Research category CN.1 Other journal article
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30106083

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Department of Economics
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