Truthmaker theory and naturalism

Rowe, David 2018, Truthmaker theory and naturalism, Metaphysica, doi: 10.1515/mp-2018-0013.

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Title Truthmaker theory and naturalism
Author(s) Rowe, David
Journal name Metaphysica
Total pages 26
Publisher De Gruyter
Place of publication Berlin, Germany
Publication date 2018-01-25
ISSN 1437-2053
1874-6373
Summary © 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This paper argues that there is a heretofore unresolved tension between truthmaker-style metaphysics and a plausible version of Naturalism. At the turn of the century, George Molnar proposed four prima facie plausible principles for a realist metaphysics in order to expose truthmaker theory's incapacity to find truthmakers for negative truths. I marshal the current plethora of attempted solutions to the problem into a crisp trilemma. Those who solve it claim that Molnar's tetrad is consistent; those who dissolve it do away with the requirement that every truth needs a truthmaker; and those who absolve it embrace a negative ontology. I argue that one is forced to absolve the problem: all other avenues undermine the truthmaker principle itself. Absolving the problem, however, does not sit well with a version of Naturalism that most would accept. We are drawn to a simple dilemma: either embrace a negative ontology, or reject truthmaker-style metaphysics.
Notes In press
Language eng
DOI 10.1515/mp-2018-0013
Field of Research 170299 Cognitive Sciences not elsewhere classified
1702 Cognitive Science
2203 Philosophy
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2018, Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30106331

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: School of Humanities and Social Sciences
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