Quantitative risk allocation in construction projects using cooperative-bargaining game theory Nasirzadeh, Farnad, Mazandaranizadeh, Hamed and Rouhparvar, Mehdi 2016, Quantitative risk allocation in construction projects using cooperative-bargaining game theory, International journal of civil engineering, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 161-170, doi: 10.1007/s40999-016-0011-8. Title Quantitative risk allocation in construction projects using cooperative-bargaining game theory Author(s) Nasirzadeh, Farnad Mazandaranizadeh, Hamed Rouhparvar, Mehdi Journal name International journal of civil engineering Volume number 14 Issue number 3 Start page 161 End page 170 Total pages 10 Publisher Springer International Publishing Place of publication Cham, Switzerland Publication date 2016-04 ISSN 1735-0522 2383-3874 Keyword(s) quantitative risk allocation bargaining game theory cooperative game theory payoff risk management Language eng DOI 10.1007/s40999-016-0011-8 HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal ERA Research output type C Journal article Copyright notice ©2016, Iran University of Science and Technology Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30106482 Document type: Journal Article Collection: School of Architecture and Built Environment Related Links Link Description Connect to published version (restricted access) Go to link with your DU access privileges     Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved. Versions Version Filter Type Thu, 22 Feb 2018, 11:53:53 EST Fri, 23 Feb 2018, 04:01:21 EST Fri, 16 Mar 2018, 05:03:15 EST Tue, 20 Mar 2018, 08:58:11 EST Tue, 20 Mar 2018, 09:00:17 EST Tue, 20 Mar 2018, 09:01:28 EST Filtered Full Citation counts:   Cited 0 times in TR Web of Science Cited 0 times in Scopus Search Google Scholar Access Statistics: 58 Abstract Views  -  Detailed Statistics Created: Thu, 22 Feb 2018, 11:53:53 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.