Optimal screening by risk-averse principals

Basov, Suren and Yin, Xiang Kang 2010, Optimal screening by risk-averse principals, B.E. journal of theoretical economics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 1-23, doi: 10.2202/1935-1704.1590.

Attached Files
Name Description MIMEType Size Downloads

Title Optimal screening by risk-averse principals
Author(s) Basov, Suren
Yin, Xiang KangORCID iD for Yin, Xiang Kang orcid.org/0000-0002-7031-414X
Journal name B.E. journal of theoretical economics
Volume number 10
Issue number 1
Article ID 8
Start page 1
End page 23
Total pages 23
Publisher De Gruyter
Place of publication Berlin, Germany
Publication date 2010
ISSN 1935-1704
Keyword(s) principal-agent model
risk aversion
random participation
common agency
Language eng
DOI 10.2202/1935-1704.1590
Field of Research 1401 Economic Theory
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2011, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30111994

Document type: Journal Article
Collection: Faculty of Business and Law
Connect to link resolver
Unless expressly stated otherwise, the copyright for items in DRO is owned by the author, with all rights reserved.

Version Filter Type
Citation counts: TR Web of Science Citation Count  Cited 3 times in TR Web of Science
Scopus Citation Count Cited 3 times in Scopus
Google Scholar Search Google Scholar
Access Statistics: 105 Abstract Views, 2 File Downloads  -  Detailed Statistics
Created: Thu, 02 Aug 2018, 16:39:26 EST

Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.