Prospect theory in a dynamic game: theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid auctions

Brünner, Tobias, Reiner, Jochen, Natter, Martin and Skiera, Bernd 2019, Prospect theory in a dynamic game: theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid auctions, Journal of economic behavior and organization, vol. 164, pp. 215-234, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.032.

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Title Prospect theory in a dynamic game: theory and evidence from online pay-per-bid auctions
Author(s) Brünner, Tobias
Reiner, Jochen
Natter, Martin
Skiera, BerndORCID iD for Skiera, Bernd orcid.org/0000-0001-9285-2013
Journal name Journal of economic behavior and organization
Volume number 164
Start page 215
End page 234
Total pages 20
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2019-08
ISSN 0167-2681
Keyword(s) Internet auction
Prospect theory
Dynamic game
Pricing
Penny auction
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.032
Indigenous content off
Field of Research 1402 Applied Economics
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
Copyright notice ©2019, Elsevier B.V.
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30123953

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Marketing
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