Pairwise kidney exchange

Roth, AE, Sönmez, T and Utku Ünver, M 2005, Pairwise kidney exchange, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 125, no. 2, pp. 151-188, doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004.


Title Pairwise kidney exchange
Author(s) Roth, AE
Sönmez, T
Utku Ünver, M
Journal name Journal of Economic Theory
Volume number 125
Issue number 2
Start page 151
End page 188
Total pages 38
Publisher Elsevier
Place of publication Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Publication date 2005-12
Keyword(s) Social Sciences
Economics
Business & Economics
market design
matching
kidney exchange
priority mechanism
Egalitarian mechanism
Lorenz dominance
COALITIONAL STRATEGY-PROOF
UNRELATED LIVE DONORS
INDIVISIBLE GOODS
HOUSE ALLOCATION
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
HLA COMPATIBILITY
STABLE MATCHINGS
RANDOM-PATHS
GAME-THEORY
ASSIGNMENT
C7
D8
Language eng
DOI 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004
Indigenous content off
Field of Research 1401 Economic Theory
1499 Other Economics
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30126718

Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
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