Strategyproof choice of social acts

Bahel, Eric and Sprumont, Yves 2020, Strategyproof choice of social acts, American Economic Review, vol. 110, no. 2, pp. 596-627, doi: 10.1257/aer.20171553.

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Title Strategyproof choice of social acts
Author(s) Bahel, Eric
Sprumont, YvesORCID iD for Sprumont, Yves
Journal name American Economic Review
Volume number 110
Issue number 2
Start page 596
End page 627
Total pages 18
Publisher American Economic Association
Place of publication Nashville, Tenn.
Publication date 2020-02
ISSN 0002-8282
Summary We model uncertain social prospects as acts mapping states of nature to (social ) outcomes. A social choice function (or SCF ) assigns an act to each profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. An SCF is strategyproof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the states of nature or her valuation of the outcomes. It is unanimous if it picks the feasible act that all agents find best whenever such an act exists. We offer a characterization of the class of strategyproof and unanimous SCFs in two settings. In the setting where all acts are feasible, the chosen act must yield the favorite outcome of some ( possibly different) agent in every state of nature. The set of states in which an agent’s favorite outcome is selected may vary with the reported belief profile; it is the union of all states assigned to her by a collection of constant, bilaterally dictatorial, or bilaterally consensual assignment rules. In a setting where each state of nature defines a possibly different subset of available outcomes, bilaterally dictatorial or consensual rules can only be used to assign control rights over states characterized by identical sets of available outcomes. (JEL D71, D81, R53)
Language eng
DOI 10.1257/aer.20171553
Indigenous content off
Field of Research 140199 Economic Theory not elsewhere classified
14 Economics
15 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services
HERDC Research category C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
ERA Research output type C Journal article
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Document type: Journal Article
Collections: Faculty of Business and Law
Department of Economics
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