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Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid

Reda, HT, Ray, B, Peidaee, P, Anwar, A, Mahmood, A, Kalam, A and Islam, N 2021, Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid, Sensors, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 1-20, doi: 10.3390/s21041554.

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Title Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid
Author(s) Reda, HT
Ray, B
Peidaee, P
Anwar, AORCID iD for Anwar, A orcid.org/0000-0003-3916-1381
Mahmood, A
Kalam, A
Islam, N
Journal name Sensors
Volume number 21
Issue number 4
Start page 1
End page 20
Total pages 20
Publisher MDPI
Place of publication Basel, Switzerland
Publication date 2021-02-23
ISSN 1424-8220
1424-8220
Keyword(s) smart grid
cybersecurity
substation protection
IEC 61850
GOOSE protocol
publish-subscribe communication
Summary IEC 61850 is one of the most prominent communication standards adopted by the smart grid community due to its high scalability, multi-vendor interoperability, and support for several input/output devices. Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE), which is a widely used communication protocol defined in IEC 61850, provides reliable and fast transmission of events for the electrical substation system. This paper investigates the security vulnerabilities of this protocol and analyzes the potential impact on the smart grid by rigorously analyzing the security of the GOOSE protocol using an automated process and identifying vulnerabilities in the context of smart grid communication. The vulnerabilities are tested using a real-time simulation and industry standard hardware-in-the-loop emulation. An in-depth experimental analysis is performed to demonstrate and verify the security weakness of the GOOSE publish-subscribe protocol towards the substation protection within the smart grid setup. It is observed that an adversary who might have familiarity with the substation network architecture can create falsified attack scenarios that can affect the physical operation of the power system. Extensive experiments using the real-time testbed validate the theoretical analysis, and the obtained experimental results prove that the GOOSE-based IEC 61850 compliant substation system is vulnerable to attacks from malicious intruders.
Language eng
DOI 10.3390/s21041554
Indigenous content off
Field of Research 0301 Analytical Chemistry
0805 Distributed Computing
0906 Electrical and Electronic Engineering
0502 Environmental Science and Management
0602 Ecology
HERDC Research category C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal
Copyright notice ©2020, The Authors
Free to Read? Yes
Use Rights Creative Commons Attribution licence
Persistent URL http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30148738

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Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items included in DRO. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au.