Certificate-based signature : security model and efficient construction
Version 2 2024-06-13, 08:46Version 2 2024-06-13, 08:46
Version 1 2014-10-28, 10:33Version 1 2014-10-28, 10:33
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posted on 2024-06-13, 08:46authored byJ Li, X Huang, Y Mu, W Susilo, Q Wu
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry introduced the notion of certificate-based encryption. The merit of certificate-based encryption lies in the following features: (1) providing more efficient public-key infrastructure (PKI) that requires less infrastructure, (2) solving the certificate revocation problem, and (3) eliminating third-party queries in the traditional PKI. In addition, it also solves the inherent key escrow problem in the identity-based cryptography. In this paper, we first introduce a new attack called the “Key Replacement Attack” in the certificate-based system and refine the security model of certificate-based signature. We show that the certificate-based signature scheme presented by Kang, Park and Hahn in CT-RSA 2004 is insecure against key replacement attacks. We then propose a new certificate-based signature scheme, which is shown to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Compared with the certificate-based signature scheme in CT-RSA 2004, our scheme enjoys shorter signature length and less operation cost, and hence, our scheme outperforms the existing schemes in the literature.