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Contested Political Persuasion

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posted on 01.02.2019, 00:00 authored by Samarth VaidyaSamarth Vaidya, Stergios Skaperdas
This chapter shows how contest and rent-seeking functions can be thought of as persuasion functions that can be derived in a Bayesian setting. Two contestants (such as lobbyists or politicians) produce evidence for a decision maker (such as an agency head or a voter) who has prior beliefs and possibly other biases and engages in Bayesian updating. The probability of each contestant winning depends on the resources and organization of the contestant, on the biases of the decision maker, and on the truth, as well as other factors. This chapter discusses how this approach can be applied to lobbying government at its three branches (legislative, executive, and judicial, the latter in terms of litigation), political campaigning, general policy formulation and advocacy in the wider media, and ideological struggles.

History

Title of book

Oxford Handbook of Public Choice - Volume 1

Volume

1

Series

Oxford Handbooks

Chapter number

33

Pagination

651 - 651

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Place of publication

New York, N.Y.

ISBN-13

9780190469733

ISBN-10

0190469730

Language

eng

Publication classification

B1 Book chapter

Copyright notice

2018, Oxford University Press

Extent

45

Editor/Contributor(s)

Roger Congleton, Bernard Grofman, Stefan Voigt

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