Contract, treaty, and sovereignty

International economic law has long had a legitimacy problem. Especially since the 1970s, with the developments coming out of the Tokyo round of GATT trade negotiations, increasing questions about whether this body was intruding into the rightful sovereignty of states became common. This criticism has increased in frequency and intensity since the 1970s, growing along with the large number of bilateral investment treaties (BITS), NAFTA, and the start and development of the WTO, extending now to the proposed Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. In this chapter, I will argue that drawing on insights from contract law provides a means to address these legitimacy concerns. It is my contention in this chapter that drawing on insights from contract law, especially relating to remedies for breach, can help solve or reduce this tension. In particular, I will argue that states should be able to craft new remedies to violations of treaty obligations, moving beyond the current rule, which is roughly equivalent to specific performance in contract law. Doing so will encourage more mutually beneficial interaction between societies without unduly limiting the policy space different societies rightfully claim.