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A data-driven attack against support vectors of SVM

Version 2 2024-06-06, 05:43
Version 1 2018-09-07, 10:09
conference contribution
posted on 2024-06-06, 05:43 authored by S Liu, W Zhou, J Zhang, Y Xiang, Y Wang, O De Vel
Machine learning (ML) is commonly used in multiple disciplines and real-world applications, such as information retrieval, financial systems, health, biometrics and online social networks. However, their security profiles against deliberate attacks have not often been considered. Sophisticated adversaries can exploit specific vulnerabilities exposed by classical ML algorithms to deceive intelligent systems. It is emerging to perform a thorough security evaluation as well as potential attacks against the machine learning techniques before developing novel methods to guarantee that machine learning can be securely applied in adversarial setting. In this paper, an effective attack strategy for crafting foreign support vectors in order to attack a classic ML algorithm, the Support Vector Machine (SVM) has been proposed with mathematical proof. The new attack can minimize the margin around the decision boundary and maximize the hinge loss simultaneously. We evaluate the new attack in different real-world applications including social spam detection, Internet traffic classification and image recognition. Experimental results highlight that the security of classifiers can be worsened by poisoning a small group of support vectors.

History

Pagination

723-734

Location

Songdo, Korea

Start date

2018-06-04

End date

2018-06-08

ISBN-13

9781450355766

Language

eng

Publication classification

E Conference publication, E1 Full written paper - refereed

Copyright notice

2018, Association for Computing Machinery.

Editor/Contributor(s)

Unknown

Title of proceedings

ASIACCS 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Event

Computer and Communications Security. Asia Conference (13th : 2018 : Songdo, Korea)

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

Place of publication

New York, N.Y.