Being philosophical regarding the evidence of 'what works'.

In this paper I am arguing that the debate regarding ‘what works’ in education practice should become more philosophical. By becoming more philosophical professional educators will be enabled to further recognise how unscientific and undemocratic the research which claims to represent ‘what works’ currently is by understanding more clearly the nature of its ‘evidence-base’ and its relation to education. This paper is structured into three parts. The first will address the philosophical aspect which is intrinsic to the discourse of education itself. The second section will offer a differentiation between empiricism and science which is important if we are to recognise the limitations of empirical ‘evidence’ regarding ‘what works’. The third and final section will draw upon Biesta’s notion of the ‘democratic deficit’ to make the case that if the evidence regarding ‘what works’ is only empirical rather than scientific then it is not the sort of evidence appropriate to the discourse of education.