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Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement
conference contributionposted on 2015-01-01, 00:00 authored by Poh Teo, A Bridge, P Love
Typically, only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for public private partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and transaction cost economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).
EventModernization of Management Committee of the China Construction Industry Association. Conference (2015 : Luleå, Sweden)
SeriesModernization of Management Committee of the China Construction Industry Association Conference
Pagination1114 - 1123
PublisherAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
Place of publicationReston, Va.
Publication classificationE Conference publication; E1.1 Full written paper - refereed
Copyright notice2015, ASCE
Editor/Contributor(s)Y Wang, T Olofsson, G Shen, Y Bai
Title of proceedingsICCREM 2015 : Environment and the sustainable building - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management
CategoriesNo categories selected
infrastructure constructionindustrial facilitiesrisk managementsustainable developmentfinancial managementproject managementreal estategreen buildingsScience & TechnologyTechnologyConstruction & Building TechnologyGreen & Sustainable Science & TechnologyScience & Technology - Other TopicsWINNERS CURSEWORKABLE COMPETITIONBIDDING MODELAUCTIONSINFORMATIONNUMBER