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Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

conference contribution
posted on 2015-01-01, 00:00 authored by Poh Teo, A Bridge, P Love
Typically, only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for public private partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and transaction cost economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

History

Event

Modernization of Management Committee of the China Construction Industry Association. Conference (2015 : Luleå, Sweden)

Series

Modernization of Management Committee of the China Construction Industry Association Conference

Pagination

1114 - 1123

Publisher

American Society of Civil Engineers

Location

Luleå, Sweden

Place of publication

Reston, Va.

Start date

2015-08-11

End date

2015-08-12

ISBN-13

9780784479377

Language

eng

Publication classification

E Conference publication; E1.1 Full written paper - refereed

Copyright notice

2015, ASCE

Editor/Contributor(s)

Y Wang, T Olofsson, G Shen, Y Bai

Title of proceedings

ICCREM 2015 : Environment and the sustainable building - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management