This paper begins by outlining Hume's understanding of perception according to which ideas are copies of impressions, which are thought to constitute a foundational confrontation with reality. This understanding is contrasted with Peirce's theory of perception according to which percepts give rise to perceptual judgements, but perceptual judgements are not a copy but an index (or 'true symptom' - just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind) of the percept. Percept and perceptual judgement are thereby able to mutually inform and correct one another in rich ways, as the perceiver develops mental habits of interpreting their surroundings.
History
Pagination
1-34
Location
Christchurch, New Zealand
Start date
2014-12-01
End date
2014-12-05
Language
eng
Notes
invited talk
Publication classification
EN.1 Other conference paper
Title of proceedings
NZAP 2014 : Proceedings of the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Conference
Event
New Zealand Association of Philosophy. Conference (2014 : Christchurch, New Zealand)