Deakin University
Browse

File(s) under permanent embargo

A comparison of different pay-per-bid auction formats

Version 2 2024-06-04, 10:33
Version 1 2017-06-26, 16:23
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-04, 10:33 authored by JY Kim, T Brünner, Bernd SkieraBernd Skiera, M Natter
Pay-per-bid auctions are a popular new type of Internet auction that is unique because a fee is charged for each bid that is placed. This paper uses a theoretical model and three large empirical data sets with 44,614 ascending and 1,460 descending pay-per-bid auctions to compare the economic effects of different pay-per-bid auction formats, such as different price increments and ascending versus descending auctions. The theoretical model suggests revenue equivalence between different price increments and descending and ascending auctions. The empirical results, however, refute the theoretical predictions: ascending auctions with smaller price increments yield, on average, higher revenues per auction than ascending auctions with higher price increments, but their revenues vary much more strongly. On average, ascending auctions yield higher revenues per auction than descending auctions, but results differ strongly across product categories. Additionally, revenues per ascending auction also vary much more strongly.

History

Journal

International Journal of Research in Marketing

Volume

31

Pagination

368-379

Location

United Kingdom

ISSN

0167-8116

Language

eng

Publication classification

C Journal article, C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2014 Elsevier

Issue

4

Publisher

Elsevier

Usage metrics

    Research Publications

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC