A demandeur-centric theory of regime design in transnational commercial law

Recent scholarship on international agreement design has almost exclusively focused on the public international law area. The literature on regime design in the area of international private law lacks a solid theoretical foundation. Academic writing on public international law's state-centric approach is only amenable to crude transplantation and poses several puzzles in the international private law context. Resolving these puzzles is important because of the proliferation of transnational commercial agreements in areas that were traditionally the province of domestic law. This paper attempts to provide a starting point to address the theoretical vacuum. Part I argues that functionalist, liberal, and realist theories cannot fully explain transnational commercial law agreement design. Part II puts forth a demandeur-centric approach with the aid of examples that span the spectrum from hard law to soft law. Part III concludes that agreement design in transnational commercial law is premised on demandeur preferences and relative power.