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Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties

Version 2 2024-06-13, 09:45
Version 1 2016-05-18, 14:40
journal contribution
posted on 2024-06-13, 09:45 authored by S Brusco, J Roy
We extend the citizen candidate model of electoral competition with sincere voting to allow for k ≥ 2 states of aggregate uncertainty. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework. We provide conditions for the existence of two-party equilibria when k = 2 and show that the policies of the two parties in any such equilibrium are not only divergent but that the parties are extremist: when the political mood is left-wing, the left-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the left of the left-wing median voter, while when the political mood is right-wing, the right-wing party wins decisively with a platform that is to the right of the right-wing median voter. We then provide conditions under which such equilibria remain robust for an arbitrary value of k.

History

Journal

Social choice and welfare

Volume

36

Pagination

83-104

Location

Berlin, Germany

ISSN

0176-1714

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1.1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal, C Journal article

Copyright notice

2010, Springer-Verlag

Issue

1

Publisher

Springer

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