Aristotle on constitutional and legal reform

The ultimate human end, on Aristotelian assumptions, is eudaimonia. If a well-ordered and just political community is integral or instrumental to the good for an individual, then it would seem incumbent on a practically wise statesman or legislator to aim at the optimal condition of the polis and hence to reform defective regimes and laws. The normative structure of Aristotle's constitutional theory-- with its conception of the best regime as an ideal and appeal to the common advantage as a criterion for distinguishing correct and deviant constitutions--likewise suggests a progressive stance towards the correction of political injustice. The overall attitude towards the reform of constitutions and laws which emerges from the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics is nonetheless cautious and conservative. This article considers the motivations for this circumspection and argues that it reflects both the importance of habituation to the effective functioning of law and a recognition of the limits of law's capacity to promote human flourishing and virtue. Section I engages in a close reading of Aristotle's treatment of the advantages and disadvantages of legal reform in the Politics Book II.8 discussion of Hippodamus' legislative proposal to honour innovation. Section II examines Aristotle's account of constitutional change and stability in light of his theory of ethical virtue. Finally, Section III turns to political obedience and argues for its dual justification within Aristotle's practical thought.