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Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program

journal contribution
posted on 01.08.2013, 00:00 authored by Nejat AnbarciNejat Anbarci, Ching-Jen SunChing-Jen Sun
This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein etal. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash's crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.

History

Journal

Economics letters

Volume

120

Issue

2

Pagination

211 - 214

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Location

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ISSN

0165-1765

eISSN

1873-7374

Language

eng

Publication classification

C1 Refereed article in a scholarly journal

Copyright notice

2013, Elsevier